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We incorporate the now standard knowledge-capital model of multinational firms in a new 
economic geography setting. The theoretical predictions of our model suggest that unskilled 
labor mobility leads to less concentration of production than skilled labor mobility does. This 
is in line with empirical evidence that agglomeration of production among European nations 
is less pronounced than among US regions. Our model shows that the different patterns in 
labor mobility can explain actual differences in the spreading of industries. According to our 
welfare analysis, trade liberalization is likely Pareto-improving for a larger (smaller) country 
with mobile unskilled (skilled) labor. 
In the supplement, we investigate the sensitivity of our results in several respects. In the first 
section, we provide the figures of real factor rewards for the trade liberalization scenarios 
discussed in and underlying Figures 7 and 8 of the paper. Second, in Figures 3(n) - 5(v) (6(n) 
- 6b(v)) we infer the existence, or non-existence, of each firm type separately in the  L λ τ − -
space ( S λ τ − -space) for country i firms and all four scenarios of firm regimes. Third, we 
illustrate how changes in the parameters µ, ρ and σ affect the outcome. Finally, we analyze 
how the asymmetric endowment with the immobile factor influences the core-periphery 
patterns. 
JEL Code: F12, F23, R12, R13. 
Keywords: knowledge-capital model, new economic geography, unskilled labor mobility, 
skilled labor mobility. 
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”European nations are less specialized than US regions” (Krugman, 1991a, p. 76).
This stylized fact was recently conﬁrmed by the study of Midelfart-Knarvik et al.
(2000). Although also European agglomeration tends to increase, especially after
the ratiﬁcation of the Maastricht Treaty that facilitates the mobility of production
factors between the EU member states (Haaland et al., 1999, Overman et al.,
2001), a gap is still left between concentration in Europe and the US. This gap
may be explained by multinational activity.
Since the early stages of new trade theory, the consideration of multinationals
may be seen as one of the major innovations in the last two decades’ economic
research (Helpman, 1984, Helpman and Krugman, 1985, Markusen, 1984). From
its beginning, this literature distinguishes ﬁrms by the scope of activities carried
out: (i) national single plant ﬁrms engaging in trade, (ii) horizontal (two-plant)
multinationals serving both the home and the foreign market locally (Markusen
and Venables, 1998, 2000), and (iii) vertical multinationals with production only
in the low-wage country and headquarters in the high-wage economy (Helpman,
1984). Both the horizontal and vertical model characterize multinationals by
intangible assets (knowledge-capital). Only in the knowledge-capital model of
multinationals and trade, all these types of ﬁrms arise endogenously and may
co-exist (for an overview see Markusen, 2002), which seems well in line with
the stylized facts (Carr et al. 2001, Markusen and Maskus, 2002, Egger and
Pfaﬀermayr, 2004).
Only recently, the links between multinational production and agglomeration
came into the limelight of research. Gao (1999) concentrates on vertical multina-
tional enterprises (MNEs), which exploit international/interregional factor cost
diﬀerences. There are no relative factor endowment diﬀerences between the two
countries. In order to produce the diﬀerentiated good, labor and the manu-
1We are grateful to Nadia Almaraz de Neuzil, Peter Huber, Gianmarco Ottaviano and
participants at research seminars at the Universities of Bologna, Ferrara and Innsbruck for
useful and constructive comments.
1facturing composite has to be used to produce the headquarter services. The
manufacturing output is furthermore used for consumption and plant set-up. He
ﬁnds that agglomeration may break down with economic integration (i.e., a re-
duction in trade costs) or economic growth. There is no agglomeration at very low
transport costs, because unskilled labor-cost diﬀerentials become more important
than the agglomeration forces in shaping production structure. Concerning the
introduction of vertical MNEs, he concludes that they speed up the spreading of
industries and thus the process of industrialization of the periphery.
Raybaudi-Massilia (2000) concentrates on speciﬁc constellations of one- and two-
plant ﬁrms. She introduces two factors, a speciﬁc one, land, and a mobile one,
labor. Firms may defect from their location choice by setting up an additional
plant, closing one of the two plants, or moving a plant from one region to the
other. As a result, the evolution of MNEs makes agglomeration of production in
only a single country/region less likely.
Ekholm and Forslid (2001) look at vertical and horizontal MNEs separately and
(i) conﬁrm Raybaudi-Massilia’s (2000) ﬁnding that rising trade costs and the
associated surge of horizontal MNEs lead to less agglomeration, and (ii) ﬁnd that
with vertical MNEs agglomeration of headquarters becomes more likely. They
introduce footloose multi-region ﬁrms which are not headquartered in a speciﬁc
country. This strong assumption leads to a unique symmetric equilibrium. A
reallocation of unskilled labor forces ﬁrms in the receiving region to produce at
a higher scale and, therefore, at lower prices. Furthermore, the smaller region
engages proportionally more in headquarter services, as ﬁxed costs are equally
borne by both regions. Accordingly, real (unskilled) labor rewards are lower in
the larger region.
Our approach diﬀers from the available work in several ways. First, it incorpo-
rates the now standard model of multinationals and trade, namely the knowledge-
capital model, in a new economic geography setting. Therefore, exporting enter-
prises (NEs) and horizontal as well as vertical MNEs may arise endogenously,2
2For instance, Ekholm and Forslid (2001) look at horizontal and vertical multi-region ﬁrm
regimes, separately.
2which allows for a richer ﬁrm and core-periphery structure. Similar to Markusen
and Venables (2000), MNEs are not footloose, but they are headquartered in one
speciﬁc country where ﬁxed costs are paid.
Second, we are interested in the dependence of agglomeration patterns on trans-
port costs, allowing either skilled or unskilled labor to be mobile as a response
to diﬀerentials in real factor rewards.3 Despite the conceptual diﬀerences to
Raybaudi-Massilia (2000), horizontal MNEs make agglomeration less likely also
in our framework.
In line with recent empirical evidence, we argue that the US are characterized by
skilled rather than unskilled labor mobility. The results in Kennan and Walker
(2003) point in this direction. For instance, they ﬁnd that unfavorable local
income conditions stimulate US interstate migration of skilled male workers.4
In contrast, there are mainly unskilled immigrants in Europe (see Sapir, 2000,
Coppel et al., 2001).5 For instance, Constant and Massey (2003) argue that Ger-
man immigrants mainly take unskilled and semi-skilled jobs shunned by natives.
This is supported by the large sample study of De New and Zimmermann (1994),
pointing out that immigration in Germany negatively aﬀects the average worker’s
wages, leaving experienced German workers unchanged. Geddes (2003, p. 156)
mentions that ”migrants and their descendants in the UK are more likely found
in lower-income and lower-status occupations, ...”. According to Rygiel (2001),
similar conclusions can be drawn for France.
Associating skilled labor mobility with the US case and unskilled labor mobil-
ity with the European case, our model provides a possible explanation for the
diﬀerent agglomeration patterns observed in Europe and the US. Our analysis
suggests that unskilled labor mobility leads to a relatively more dispersed struc-
3In our model, agglomeration is driven by factor mobility rather than product market link-
ages as, e.g., in Gao (1999).
4Even at the level of international immigration, Adams (2003) reports that about two thirds
of the US immigrants have at least secondary education levels.
5However, it should be noted that migration rates in Europe are generally lower than in the
US (see Bentivogli and Pagano, 1999). This seems mainly due to the more rigid labor markets
and the diﬀerent institutional framework in Europe (see Adsera and Boix, 2000, Sapir, 2000,
Puga, 2002).
3ture than skilled labor mobility. This ﬁts nicely with the empirical stylized facts
of both the diﬀerent agglomeration patterns and the skill-speciﬁc characteristics
of the mobility of workers in Europe and the US. Hence, we might conclude that
these diﬀerent types of factor mobility together with the activity of multinational
ﬁrms are one of the driving forces behind the diﬀerent agglomeration patterns
observed.
Finally, we investigate the welfare consequences of trade liberalization. This is
important, since, in the long run, trade costs are not necessarily ﬁxed, but they are
aﬀected by country politics (e.g., infrastructure investments). Hence, countries
may choose to liberalize trade, depending on its impact on factor migration. For
the larger country, the welfare analysis suggests that trade liberalization is likely
to raise both, skilled and unskilled labor wages. For low values of trade costs,
both countries gain individually from further liberalizing trade, irrespective of
which factor is mobile.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model, Section
3 looks at the core-periphery patterns. The welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization
are analyzed in Section 4. In Section 5, we assess the robustness of our results
with respect to changes of several decisive parameters. The last section concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
There are two countries, referred to as country 1 and 2, and indexed as {i,j} =
{1,2}. Both countries produce two tradable goods, Z and X. Z is a homogeneous
good produced at constant returns to scale by a competitive industry. X-goods
are diﬀerentiated in the usual Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) fashion. We consider the
following ﬁrm types: national enterprises (NEs) sell on the local market and ex-
port to the other country, where the number of national enterprises of country i is
denoted by ni; horizontal multinational enterprises (MNEs) are running produc-
tion plants in both countries, where hi denotes the number of horizontal MNEs
4headquartered in i; vertical MNEs are able to unbundle the headquarter and the
production plant, where vi is the number of vertical MNEs with headquarters in
i and production plants only in j. In contrast to horizontal MNEs, vertical ones
engage in goods trade. Quantities are indexed as follows: the ﬁrst subscript indi-
cates the country where the headquarter is based, the second subscript denotes
the country where the variety is sold and the superscript refers to the ﬁrm type.
Therefore, Xn
ij are the exports of country i-based NEs to country j and Xh
ij are
sales of country i-based horizontal MNEs in country j.6 Similar deﬁnitions apply
for the other ﬁrm types. Xic denotes the consumption of X in country i, being
a CES aggregate of the individual varieties. Consumer preferences are assumed
to be a nest of the homogeneous Z-good and the diﬀerentiated X-good. The
symmetry of varieties within a group of goods allows to formulate the utility of
country i (Ui) as follows:
Ui = X
µ













































where µ denotes the Cobb-Douglas expenditure share for diﬀerentiated products,
and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
We assume that Z-goods are costlessly tradable across countries, whereas X-
goods trade incurs iceberg transport costs (τ), which are symmetric for either
direction of shipment. In terms of quantity, one unit of consumption of an X-
variety in country j requires a ﬁrm in i to send (1 + τ) units. For convenience,
quantities of X are deﬁned as (both of NEs and vertical MNEs) ﬁrm-speciﬁc
productions for the respective foreign market.
As usual, the consumer’s maximization problem can be solved in two steps. In
the ﬁrst step, each variety Xk
ij, k ∈ {n,h,v}, needs to be chosen such that it
minimizes the cost of attaining Xic, whatever the consumption of Xic is. In the
second step, consumers allocate income between the Z-good and the composite
6Whenever we use i and j from the set {1,2}, this implies that i  = j.
5X-good. Let pk
ji be the price of an X variety in country i produced by a type-k
ﬁrm headquartered in country j. The price for the homogeneous good, qi, is
indexed once, since all (indigenous and foreign) homogeneous goods consumed
at a single location i must face the same price qi. We take q1 as the num´ eraire.
Further, Pi denotes the price aggregator, deﬁned as the minimum cost of buying
one unit of Xic at prices pk










ji s.t. Xic = 1. (2)








i µYi ∀ i,j ∈ {1,2} ∧ ∀ k ∈ {n,h,v}, (3)
where Yi denotes total expenditures of consumers in country i. Identical price
elasticities of demand and identical marginal costs (technologies) within a coun-
try ensure that the price of a locally produced good is equal to the mill price
for exports. Moreover, all ﬁrms producing in the same country face the same
marginal costs. Hence, prices of all goods produced in one country are equal in
equilibrium. pi denotes the price of all goods produced in country i. With these
assumptions, the price aggregator Pi of diﬀerentiated goods consumed in country
i can be written as
Pi =
￿
(ni + hi + hj + vj)p
1−σ
i + (nj + vi)((1 + τ)pj)
1−σ￿ 1
1−σ . (4)










2.2 Factor Markets, Production and Income
Let wSi and wLi denote the factor rewards for skilled and unskilled labor in
country i, respectively. Assuming that Z-production only uses unskilled labor
6(L), variable unit costs (i.e., marginal costs) cZi satisfy
czi ≥ wLi ⊥ Zii ≥ 0, (7)
where ⊥ indicates that at least one of the adjacent conditions has to hold with
equality. This implies
czi ≥ qj ⊥ Zij ≥ 0. (8)
There is monopolistic competition in the X-sector, and each ﬁrm produces under
a CES technology, using both factors (where ’a’ is the coeﬃcient for skilled labor
and ’1 − a’ for unskilled labor), with an elasticity of substitution of 1/(1 − ρ)
(−∞ < ρ < 1). As all ﬁrms face the same factor prices and the CES technology
is homothetic, all ﬁrm types in a country face the same unit input coeﬃcients.
The country speciﬁc unit input coeﬃcient for the two factors of X-production











































Additionally, national enterprises and horizontal and vertical MNEs require skilled
labor to set up plants (aSni,aShi,aSvi), and they employ unskilled labor to orga-
nize the multinational network (aLni,aLhi,aLvi). In line with the literature (see
for example Markusen, 2002), we assume that ﬁrm speciﬁc ﬁxed costs are highest
for horizontal MNEs, slightly lower for vertical ones, and lowest for exporters:
aSniwSi + aLniwLi < aSviwsi + aLviwLi < aShiwSi + aLhiwLi, and, speciﬁcally,
aSni = aLni = 1, aSvi = aShi = 1 + δ, aLvi = 1 + γ, and aLhi = 2 + γ, with-
out loss of generality. δ is the additional skilled labor requirement to organize a
multinational network, and 1 + γ are the ﬁxed costs in terms of unskilled labor
country i’s MNEs have to incur to set up a foreign plant in j. As mentioned
above, horizontal MNEs also run local production plants, which is reﬂected by
aShi > aSvi.




































+Zij + aLnini + aLhihi + aLvivi ⊥ wLi ≥ 0. (12)
Variable unit costs of producing an X-variety in country i are given by cXi =
aSxiwSi+aLxiwLi. There is a ﬁxed markup over variable costs, which is determined
by the elasticity of substitution between varieties. Given that under CES-utility





Free entry implies that ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts, since operating proﬁts are used to
cover ﬁxed costs. The corresponding zero-proﬁt conditions determine the num-
bers of ﬁrms.
National enterprises in i have to bear ﬁxed costs of FCni = aSniwSi + aLniwLi.









⊥ ni ≥ 0. (14)
Vertical and horizontal MNEs are able to cover their ﬁxed costs (FCvi = aSviwSi+
aLviwLi,FChi = aShiwSi+aLhiwLi) via operating proﬁts of both the local and the















⊥ hi ≥ 0. (16)
All factors are owned by the households, so that consumer income (i.e., GNP) in
country i is given by
Yi = wSiSi + wLiLi. (17)
The equivalence of total factor income (Yi, Yj) and demand in each country
implicitly balances payments between countries.

















In contrast to the standard new economic geography models ` a la Krugman
(1991b), production of the manufacturing good uses two input factors (S and
L). In the standard new economic geography models it is straightforward to as-
sume that the factor used in the manufacturing sector is mobile across countries.
In our setting, both factors are immobile in the short run. In the long run, we
investigate situations where either unskilled labor L (intensively used in homo-
geneous goods production and plant set-up) or skilled labor S (intensively used
in diﬀerentiated goods production and in research) is mobile.7 For both types of
labor mobility we look at the eﬀects of the ﬁrm regimes and, therefore, at the
importance of the three types of ﬁrms that may endogenously arise in our model:
exporting ﬁrms, horizontal MNEs, and vertical MNEs. By simulating scenarios
where either horizontal FDI, vertical FDI or both are restricted for some ex-
ogenous reason, we ﬁnd that the possible coexistence of all three types of ﬁrms
changes the core-periphery structure signiﬁcantly.
3.1 Unskilled Labor Mobility
Figure 1 depicts the agglomeration pattern at constant transport costs (τ = 0.2)
if unskilled labor is mobile, where λL(λS) denotes country i’s share of world
endowment of unskilled (skilled) labor. A long run equilibrium is deﬁned similar
to Krugman (1991b) by real wage equalization across countries (ωLi = ωLj if
unskilled labor is mobile and ωSi = ωSj if skilled labor is mobile).
We ﬁnd seven interior equilibria, four stable and three unstable ones. The stabil-
ity of a long run equilibrium can be veriﬁed by exogenously shifting one unit of
unskilled labor to the other country, and deriving the new short run equilibrium.
7We have chosen the following parameter values for our simulations: δ = 0.01, γ = 0.05,
σ = 4, µ = 0.8, ρ = −1, a = 0.8, τ = 0.2 if constant, L = L1 + L2 = 100, S = S1 + S2 = 50.
As mentioned by Baldwin et al. (2003), if both factors were mobile, one country would become
”extinct”, due to the incentive to avoid trade costs by agglomerating in one country.



















Figure 1: Core-periphery pattern with mobile unskilled labor and λS = 0.5,
τ = 0.2.
Then, ﬁrms are allowed to enter and exit to avoid losses and exploit proﬁts. If
this reallocation of production factors results in a decline of real wages in the
receiving country, the initial equilibrium can be considered as stable. Otherwise,
the initial equilibrium is unstable, because even more workers have an incentive
to relocate.
Only partially agglomerated equilibria are stable in the long run, whereas the
symmetric equilibrium is unstable. Note that in Figure 1 points left to λLi = 0.5
are the inverse of those to the right. Looking at the left part of the ﬁgure (i.e.,
when country i is small in terms of L), there are two diﬀerent partially agglom-
erated equilibria for the same value of transport costs. In the equilibrium with
a high level of agglomeration (at λLi ≈ 0.25) vertical MNEs are important (see
also Figure 2).8 Also NEs and horizontal MNEs are present in this equilibrium.
Coexistence of all three ﬁrm types based in one country is possible if the following
8Follow the vertical solid lines in Figure 2 to see which types of ﬁrms exist in each of the
long run stable equilibria of Figure 1.






























Figure 2: Firm structure corresponding to Figure 1.


























The left-hand side is the ratio of ﬁxed to variable costs of a national ﬁrm. The
ﬁrst term on the right-hand side gives the ratio of the ﬁxed cost diﬀerence of hori-
zontal and vertical MNEs to the diﬀerence of their respective revenues for serving
the home market.9 The second term gives the ratio of the ﬁxed cost diﬀerence
of horizontal MNEs and national ﬁrms to the diﬀerence of their respective mar-
ginal revenues for serving the foreign market. The two terms are scaled by the
relative importance of the foreign and home market for total sales of a national
ﬁrm. The coexistence between horizontal MNEs and vertical MNEs is mainly
determined by the revenues in the home market, whereas the decision to set up
a plant abroad or to serve the foreign market via export is driven by the market
9For convenience, we have already divided all expressions by the constant markup and the
identical quantities. Accordingly, the revenue diﬀerence is represented by the expressions in
Equation 20. See the Appendix for further details.
11conditions abroad. This condition is more likely fulﬁlled if the labor abundant
country specializes in homogeneous goods production and the labor scarce one
in running headquarter services. Alternatively, the condition more likely holds
if an extremely labor abundant country specializes in both, homogeneous goods
production and headquarter services, whereas the other country specializes in
diﬀerentiated goods production.
If the endowment diﬀerences with unskilled labor between countries are small, a
stable agglomerated equilibrium is dominated by horizontal MNEs headquartered
in the smaller country (such as the equilibrium at λLi ≈ 0.33). This outcome
seems to be somewhat surprising, as one would expect agglomeration to take place
in the larger country. However, the ﬁrm structure per se is not informative with
respect to production volumes. In our setting, the smaller country is relatively
skilled labor abundant (since λL < λS by assumption) and, therefore, exhibits
a comparative advantage in running MNEs, since setting up the multinational
network requires additional skilled labor input.10 Country i could be considered
as a developed one, specializing in the provision of headquarter services and
skilled labor-intensive goods.11 In contrast, the larger country j is unskilled
labor-abundant, specialized in the production of homogeneous goods rather than
research and brand proliferation.
Concerning the ﬁrm regimes, we ﬁnd that horizontal MNEs exist in one of two
cases. First, if unskilled labor endowments are very diﬀerent between the coun-
tries. This implies strong relative factor endowment diﬀerences, where the un-
skilled labor abundant country specializes in homogeneous products and head-
quarter services. As skilled labor is scarce, factor prices and hence incomes are
high, so that the market size justiﬁes to run two plants in order to avoid transport
costs. Second, for similarly endowed countries, the respective foreign market is
large enough to invest in a plant in order to save transport costs. If a country
10Note that we assume that ﬁrms use only skilled labor from the home country to provide
headquarter services. Allowing ﬁrms to split their ﬁrm- and/or plant-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs would
add an additional vertical dimension to all MNEs, making it harder to study the diﬀerent
eﬀects of horizontal and vertical FDI on the agglomeration patterns.
11Since there are variable input coeﬃcients, production of X-goods in country i is more
skilled labor-intensive than in country j.
12becomes unskilled labor abundant, skilled labor is essential for producing manu-
factured goods and, therefore, not used for setting up a multinational network.12
This is the case in the long run stable equilibria at λLi ≈ 0.66 and λLi ≈ 0.72.
So far, we have analyzed the core-periphery pattern and the ﬁrm structure at a
speciﬁc value of transport costs. Now, we investigate at which levels of transport
costs agglomeration is a possible outcome (the sustain point as in Fujita et al.,
1999), and at which it is a necessary one (the break point).
Let transport costs (τ) vary between 0.005 and 0.495 in order to capture them in
their empirically relevant range, as pointed out by Hummels (1999) or Baier and
Bergstrand (2001). Figure 3 shows the resulting core-periphery bifurcation.13
If transport costs are very high, only horizontal MNEs exist due to the proximity-
concentration trade-oﬀ. At the left bound of the equilibrium area, equilibria with
horizontal MNEs only (within the shaded area) and other plant conﬁgurations
(to the left of the shaded area) meet. At symmetry (λL = 0.5), NEs and MNEs
will only co-exist at the bound of the equilibrium area. We can make use of the
zero-proﬁt conditions (14) and (16) to characterize the condition of co-existence





1 + (1 + τ)1−σ. (21)
(21) represents the well-known proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ. It states that
horizontal MNEs and NEs will only co-exist if high plant-setup costs are matched
by suﬃciently high transport costs. If trade costs are too high in relation to ﬁxed
plant set-up costs, only horizontal MNEs can survive (at λL = 0.5 within the
shaded equilibrium area). If trade costs are too low, it does not pay oﬀ to run
foreign plants (at λL = 0.5 to the left of the shaded equilibrium area).
If only horizontal MNEs are present, the price indices in both countries are the
same (Pi = Pj, which follows from Equation 4 after taking into account that pi =
12Note that a very high ratio of unskilled to skilled labor leads to a specialization in homo-
geneous goods production and leads again to headquarters in the respective country.
13In all bifurcation diagrams, long run stable equilibria are depicted by solid lines, areas
of long run stable equilibria are cross-hatched and bordered by dashed lines, and unstable
equilibria are indicated by dotted lines.
13Figure 3: Bifurcation diagram with mobile unskilled labor and λS = 0.5, all ﬁrm
types.
pj in the exclusive presence of horizontal MNEs). Together with the possibility
of free trade of agricultural goods and shifting of factor intensities in production,
this leads to an equilibrium area where both real wages for unskilled as well as
skilled labor are equalized, if only horizontal MNEs exist and production patterns
are diversiﬁed. Hence, shifts of unskilled labor supply in a speciﬁc range do not
alter the ﬁrm structure and, therefore, a long run equilibrium exists (ensured by
∂ωLi
∂λ = 0), even at λL  = 0.5. This is in contrast to Ekholm and Forslid (2001)
who ﬁnd a unique stable symmetric equilibrium if only horizontal MNEs exist,
due to their assumption of footloose MNEs that are forced to cover their ﬁxed
costs in both countries in equal proportions.
At low transport costs, only the symmetric equilibrium is stable in the long
run, because it does not pay oﬀ to run horizontal MNEs. In this case, even
vertical MNEs do not exist since factor price diﬀerences are too small to render
unbundling proﬁtable.
In Figure 3, there are two break points. Moving from the left towards the right,
14a symmetric equilibrium remains stable until τ ≈ 0.19. Then, this equilibrium
breaks and we may end up in either one of the two diﬀerent long run stable
partially agglomerated equilibria. Starting from high transport costs (i.e., moving
from the right to the left), we obtain another break point at τ ≈ 0.22. There, the
long run stable equilibrium area collapses and a core-periphery pattern necessarily
emerges.
If we are initially in a partially agglomerated equilibrium (for historical reasons
or by incidence), we ﬁnd a rather wide sustain range at 0.14 / τ / 0.3. The
reason for this is our rich model structure which enables ﬁrms to exploit real
wage diﬀerentials. This equalizes real factor rewards so that there is no incentive
for migration. This is in line with the empirical observation that wage diﬀeren-
tials of the unskilled diminish, despite unskilled labor being still quite immobile
(see for instance Barba Navaretti et al., 2002; Puga, 2002). Our outcome sug-
gests that unskilled labor mobility is not necessary to obtain equalization of
real unskilled labor rewards, and that an unequal division of unskilled labor be-
tween countries can be a long run stable equilibrium for a wide range of transport
costs. Within the two diﬀerent partially agglomerated equilibria, the ﬁrm regimes
vary considerably. As indicated above, in the more agglomerated equilibrium (at
0.14 / τ / 0.22) factor price diﬀerences are big enough to render disentangling
of headquarter services and production worthwhile so that vertical MNEs exist.
In contrast, the other partially agglomerated equilibrium (at 0.19 / τ / 0.3) is
dominated by horizontal MNEs, since higher transport costs increase the incen-
tives to set up two plants in order to serve each market locally.
Now we turn to investigate the importance of the diﬀerent types of ﬁrms for
the development of the core-periphery pattern. This is done by looking at three
diﬀerent scenarios: (i) the case of NEs only (MNEs are not allowed to come into
existence although it might be optimal), (ii) NEs and horizontal MNEs, and (iii)
NEs and vertical MNEs.
Figures 4 and 5 show the resulting bifurcation diagrams for these scenarios. With
exporting ﬁrms only, the symmetric equilibrium is stable for all values of transport
15Figure 4: Bifurcation diagram with mobile unskilled labor and λS = 0.5, NEs
and horizontal MNEs











Figure 5: Bifurcation diagram with mobile unskilled labor and λS = 0.5, NEs
and vertical MNEs
16costs.14 The reason is that a one unit shift of unskilled labor leads to concentra-
tion of ﬁrms in the larger country (this is the well known home market eﬀect). In
turn, this leads to both higher skilled labor rewards and prices, thereby lowering
real unskilled labor rewards. Accordingly, the symmetric equilibrium is stable.
Whereas all types of ﬁrms are allowed to coexist in Figure 3, vertical MNEs may
not arise in Figure 4. A comparison identiﬁes the importance of vertical MNEs
for partial agglomeration to arise at moderate levels of trade costs. Without the
possibility of unbundling of headquarter services and production through vertical
MNEs, an extremely unequal unskilled labor distribution between countries can
not be sustained as a long-run stable equilibrium. Hence, similar to and even be-
yond migration, vertical MNE activity is a source of real factor price equalization
(see Helpman, 1984).
Consider a third scenario with NEs and vertical MNEs, where horizontal MNEs
are not allowed to exist (Figure 5) and compare this scenario with the original
one where all ﬁrm types may arise endogenously (Figure 3). It turns out that the
partially agglomerated equilibrium (represented by values of 0.14 / τ / 0.18 and
λ ≈ 0.25) in Figure 3 remains stable stable even for a large range of transport
costs in Figure 5, where horizontal MNEs may not exist. In this country, factor
price diﬀerences of skilled labor are large enough so that even for high transport
costs it pays to unbundle headquarter services and production. If horizontal
MNEs may not arise endogenously, there is no way for ﬁrms to avoid transport
costs for serving the second market, where production does not take place. Hence,
focussing on NEs and vertical MNEs only can lead to misleading results. The
reason is that vertical MNEs come into existence at high trade costs. This would
not happen, if also horizontal MNEs could endogenously arise.
3.2 Skilled Labor Mobility
If skilled labor is mobile and unskilled labor equally allocated (λL = 0.5), there
is no interior stable equilibrium other than the equilibrium area with horizon-
14The bifurcation diagrams with NEs only are provided in the supplementary material to
this paper.
17tal MNEs only. In contrast to the case of mobile unskilled labor, the symmetric
equilibrium is unstable, and full agglomeration is stable for all values of transport
costs. In the country where all the skilled labor is agglomerated, only exporting
ﬁrms exist. Since both headquarter services and diﬀerentiated goods production
use skilled and unskilled labor, the skilled labor scarce country is forced to spe-
cialize in homogeneous goods production. Homogeneous goods are exported in
exchange for diﬀerentiated products. Note that this is fully in line with the stan-
dard new economic geography models, which also predict full agglomeration if
trade costs are low. In our case such as in the standard new economic geography
model, full agglomeration is no longer sustainable if trade costs are very high
(at τ ≈ 1.7 in our simulation scenario), leading to the well known tomahawk-
bifurcation.
The bifurcation diagram with mobile skilled labor (Figure 6) shows an equilibrium
area with horizontal MNEs at transport costs of τ ≥ 0.23. As in the case of
unskilled labor mobility, there is equalization of both real wages for skilled and
unskilled labor within the equilibrium area.15 At low values of transport costs,
only full agglomeration of skilled labor in either country satisﬁes our long run
equilibrium conditions. The reason is that the centrifugal forces are too strong
for a symmetric equilibrium to be stable.
In Figure 6, there is one break point at τ ≈ 0.23 when moving from the right
to the left, but there is no sustain point. In other words, we ﬁnd a quite large
range (0.495 ≥ τ ' 0.23) where long run equilibria can arise at diﬀerent values
of λS (0.32 / λS / 0.68), when starting from very high transport costs. In
contrast, at τ / 0.23 full agglomeration is the only stable equilibrium, which
remains sustainable for all values of transport costs, when starting from either
low or high transport costs. With skilled labor mobility, a long run symmetric
equilibrium can only be reached, if transport costs are suﬃciently high (i.e., higher
than the break point). At lower transport costs, the centrifugal forces are strong
15Note, that the equilibrium areas for the bifurcation diagrams with unskilled and skilled
labor are quite similar. They start at the same value of transport costs and reach from about
λ = 0.32 to λ = 0.68.
18Figure 6: Bifurcation diagram with mobile skilled labor and λL = 0.5, all ﬁrm
types.
enough to motivate agglomeration. Since most products incur transport costs
lower than 33% (see Hummels, 1999; Baier and Bergstrand, 2001), our model
can cope with the observed agglomeration tendency of skilled labor.
Let us now discuss each ﬁrm type’s importance for the development of the core-
periphery patterns in the case of skilled labor mobility. In the scenario with NEs
only, we can replicate the tomahawk bifurcation. For the range of transport costs
plotted, only the full agglomeration equilibria are long-run stable ones. Hence,
with MNEs it is possible to sustain a dispersed equilibrium at suﬃciently high
transport costs. This does not contradict Gao’s (1999) result that vertical MNEs
speed up the spread of industries. The reason is that, with skilled labor mobil-
ity and no forward-backward linkages through intermediate products, horizontal
MNEs become much more important than vertical ones. With skilled labor mo-
bility real factor price equalization for both factors is stimulated, since the factor
price diﬀerential for unskilled labor is restricted by costless homogeneous goods
trade (recall that homogeneous goods only require unskilled labor in production).
19In this case, unbundling of headquarter services and production by vertical MNEs
is not proﬁtable in equilibrium. However, horizontal MNEs arise even in the ab-
sence of factor price diﬀerences, since they come into existence whenever it pays
to economize on transport costs.
The importance of horizontal MNEs is reﬂected by looking at the bifurcation
diagram with NEs and horizontal MNEs. Here, the core-periphery pattern is
exactly the same as if all three types of ﬁrms were allowed to coexist. Vertical
MNEs do not inﬂuence the core-periphery patterns in the case of skilled labor
mobility, since the agglomeration structure in the scenario with both NEs and
vertical MNEs is the same as for that one with NEs only. Note that vertical
MNEs do exist in this scenario, but they are not important enough to have an
impact on the core-periphery pattern.
Comparing the agglomeration patterns in the cases of skilled and unskilled labor
mobility, we see that overall the concentration tends to be higher when skilled
labor is mobile. This is true for all long-run stable equilibria for lower values
of trade costs (τ / 0.23). When trade costs are higher than τ ≈ 0.23, there
is an equilibrium area when unskilled labor is mobile. Besides the equilibrium
area, full agglomeration is a possible equilibrium in case of skilled labor mobility.
Hence, the result for high transport costs can be the same with either factor
mobility or is more concentrated with skilled labor mobility. As far as the eﬀects
of diﬀerent ﬁrm regimes are concerned, unskilled labor mobility is compatible
with a richer ﬁrm structure in the long-run stable equilibria. This is due to the
fact that vertical MNEs headquartered in the unskilled labor scarce (and thus
relatively skilled labor abundant) country can exploit factor price diﬀerentials
of skilled labor, and set up their production plant in the country where skilled
labor is relatively cheap. With skilled labor mobility, migration an disentangling
of production processes have the same eﬀect, which is manifested in the same
agglomeration patterns in the long run.











Figure 7: Regions of the bifurcation diagram with mobile unskilled labor where
Pareto-improvements are possible.
4 Eﬀects of Trade Liberalization on Real Factor
Rewards
In order to determine a country’s attitude towards trade liberalization, we look
at the real factor rewards in each of the previously introduced bifurcation dia-
grams. Again, we compare the outcome with the counterfactual models where
only NEs, only Nes and horizontal MNEs, or oonly NEs and vertical MNEs may
endogenously arise. We only consider long run stable equilibria and denote in
the case of partially agglomerated equilibria country i as the mobile factor scarce
one (λ < 0.5) and country j as the mobile factor abundant one (λ > 0.5). Fol-
lowing Wong (2001), we speak of a Pareto-improving change in trade costs for a
country, if at least one factor price in that country increases in real terms and
none decreases after liberalization.16
Figures 4 depicts only those long run stable equilibria with mobile unskilled labor
where Pareto-improvements due to trade liberalization are possible according to
16The underlying graphs of real factor rewards can be found in the supplementary material
to this paper.
21the previously introduced criterion. This ﬁgure displays a sub-set of the equilibria
illustrated in Figure 3.
For example, for τ = 0.1 we obtain three long run stable equilibria in the bifur-
cation diagram with unskilled labor mobility (Figure 3). From Figure 4 we see
that if trade costs are lower than τ ≈ 0.18, further liberalizing trade is Pareto-
improving for both countries, irrespective of whether we are in the long-run stable
symmetric equilibrium or in the partially agglomerated equilibria. If trade costs
are between 0.22 / τ / 0.26, only one of the partially agglomerated equilibria is
stable. In this case, trade liberalization is Pareto-improving for the larger coun-
try but not for the smaller one. The reason is that the smaller country mainly
headquarters horizontal MNEs which do not proﬁt from trade liberalization. In
contrast, NEs dominate the ﬁrm structure in the larger country. Actually, the
larger country is in favor of trade liberalization in the symmetric equilibrium and
in both partially agglomerated equilibria.
How do these results conmpare with other models characterized by more restric-
tive plant conﬁgurations, namely only NEs, only NEs and vertical MNEs, and
only NEs and horizontal MNEs? If either only NEs or both NEs and vertical
MNEs are allowed to exist, trade liberalization is beneﬁcial in both countries at
all values of transport costs. If only NEs and horizontal MNEs may exist, the
range of trade costs where trade liberalization is Pareto-improving, is similar to
Figure 4 where all ﬁrm types may arise endogenously. However, if vertical MNEs
may exist as well, trade liberalization is Pareto-improving even in the partially
agglomerated equilibrium at trade costs of 0.14 / τ / 0.18 in Figure 4.
In case of skilled labor mobility, trade liberalization is never Pareto-improving
for the larger country but always for the smaller one. This result holds true for
our model as well as the more restricted ones that do not allow all ﬁrm types
to arise endogenously. Put diﬀerently, in the fully agglomerated equilibrium, the
country ending up without any skilled labor prefers to liberalize trade. How-
ever, the country ending up with all the available skilled labor would never adopt
such a policy. The skilled labor abundant country runs NEs, whereas the smaller
22country specializes in homogeneous goods trade. Reducing trade costs for the
diﬀerentiated product leads to a gain for the smaller country, since more diﬀer-
entiated goods are aﬀordable for every unit of the homogeneous good exported.
Within the equilibrium area where horizontal MNEs are present, trade liberal-
ization is not Pareto-improving for the smaller country either, since real (and
nominal) factor prices are equalized and do not change after a reduction of trade
costs.
Summing up, trade liberalization is likely Pareto-improving for the larger country,
if unskilled labor is mobile. By way of contrast, if skilled labor is mobile, the
smaller country is in favor of adopting a trade liberalizing policy, whereas the
larger country is never better oﬀ.
5 Robustness of the Findings
To investigate the robustness of our results, we discuss variations of the para-
meters µ, ρ and σ. For every new parameter value, we analyze the eﬀects with
respect to our two reference cases for unskilled as well as skilled labor mobil-
ity, where the respective immobile factor is equally allocated between the two
countries.
So far, consumers are assumed to spend 80% (µ = 0.8) of their income on man-
ufactured goods (this is well supported by empirical evidence). We lower this
value to (i) µ = 0.7, (ii) µ = 0.5, and (iii) µ = 0.3, where the latter is the value
frequently used in new economic geography models, for instance in Krugman
(1991b) or Ekholm and Forslid (2001). We ﬁnd that for lower values of µ, MNEs
become less important, because for a too low income spent on manufactures it
does not pay to incur high ﬁxed costs associated with foreign aﬃliates.
We continue by analyzing the eﬀects of reducing the substitutability between
skilled and unskilled labor, ρ, to −5 (corresponding to a TRS of 1/6) and −20
(TRS=1/21), respectively. As skilled labor is not only needed in manufacturing
goods production but also essential for covering plant set-up costs, a lower sub-
23stitutability between the two types of labor in the production of manufactures
causes the skilled labor reward to rise. Thus, setting up MNEs becomes less
attractive and, therefore, the equilibrium area with only horizontal MNEs gets
smaller and only exists for high transport costs. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the long
run stable, partially agglomerated equilibria are present over the whole range of
transport costs, and that the agglomeration itself is more pronounced. Making
factors in production of manufactured goods more substitutive (changing ρ from
−1 to 0.5 (implying a TRS of 2) and 5/6 (TRS=6), respectively), leads the par-
tially agglomerated equilibria to be more pronounced, and the equilibrium area
with only horizontal MNEs appears for a larger range of transport costs. Overall,
lower (higher) values of ρ shift the bifurcation diagrams to the right (left).
A lower elasticity of substitution between varieties of the manufactured good
(additionally to σ = 4, we run experiments for σ = 2 and σ = 6) implies that the
equilibrium area with only horizontal MNEs becomes smaller or even vanishes.
On the other hand, the ranges of the long run stable symmetric equilibrium as well
as the partially agglomerated equilibria rise as σ gets lower. In contrast, running
vertical MNEs becomes more attractive. The reason is that the demand for
manufactures is less sensitive to price changes at a lower values of σ. This renders
multi-plant production by horizontal MNEs less attractive, since the avoidance
of transport costs becomes less important.
By and large, the main agglomeration patterns prove to be robust with respect
to moderate changes in µ, ρ and σ. We mainly observe leftward or rightward
shifts of the bifurcations, which can be explained by the changing underlying
ﬁrm structure (proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ).
6 Conclusions
Empirical evidence suggests that European nations are less concentrated than US
countries. To the best of our knowledge, new economic geography models with
multinational ﬁrms do not deal explicitly with these diﬀerences in the agglomer-
ation patterns so far.
24We incorporate the now standard knowledge-capital model of multinationals in
a new economic geography setting to account for the growing importance of
foreign direct investment in the last decades. Accordingly, exporting ﬁrms and
both horizontal and vertical multinational ﬁrms may endogenously arise. There
are two sectors, a homogeneous one producing with unskilled labor only, and a
diﬀerentiated one, which uses both skilled and unskilled labor in production. We
ﬁnd that the existence of multinationals leads to more pronounced core periphery
patterns.
Recent empirical studies point to an important diﬀerence between Europe and
the US, namely that in Europe unskilled labor is more mobile than skilled labor
and that the reverse is true for the US. Accordingly, we analyze the agglomeration
patterns for both unskilled and skilled labor mobility, arguing that the former
represents the European case and the latter one the US case.
The theoretical predictions of the agglomeration patterns in our model suggest
that unskilled labor mobility leads to lower concentration than skilled labor mo-
bility. The diﬀerent modes of factor mobility between Europe and the US could
therefore be important to explain the observed diﬀerences in the spreading of
industries.
According to our welfare analysis, trade liberalization is likely Pareto-improving
for the larger country if unskilled labor is mobile. At skilled labor is mobility,
the smaller country likely gains from trade liberalization. By and large, these
results prove robust with respect to moderate changes in the parametrization of
the model.
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29A Appendix
Derivation of equation 20:
As ﬁrms are symmetric and varieties from diﬀerent ﬁrms enter the utility function





ji = e Xi ∀ i,j ∈ {1,2} ∧ i  = j. Furthermore,















ji. With these assumptions the zero-proﬁt condi-
tions can be written as:
FCni =


















cXi e Xi + cXj e Xj
σ − 1
. (A1)
Taking the diﬀerence between FChi and FCvi, we can solve for e Xi:
e Xi =
(FChi − FCvi)(σ − 1)





Similar, by taking the diﬀerence between FChi and FCni we can solve for e Xj:
e Xj =
(FChi − FCni)(σ − 1)





Note that in equations A2 and A3 the nominator is always positive. As quantities


















< 1 + τ. (A4)
This condition implies that diﬀerences in variable costs are restricted to be within
a range whose boundaries depend on the transport costs τ in order to render
coexistence of all three ﬁrm types possible. Outside this range, one of the ﬁrms
30does no longer exist. Note that condition (A4) is necessary for coexistence but
not suﬃcient.
Plugging the expressions for e Xi and e Xj (i.e., using equations A2 and A3) in the

























31S1 Figures of Real Factor Rewards
Figures 9-15 display the real factor rewards in the long-run stable equilibria of the
bifurcation diagrams with mobile skilled and unskilled labor. From these ¯gures, we
learn for which values of trade costs trade liberalization is Pareto-improving. These
regions are depicted in Figure 6 in the paper.






























Figure 9: Real factor rewards of unskilled labor in the stable equilibria of the bifur-
cation with mobile unskilled labor.


























Figure 10: Real factor rewards of skilled labor in the stable equilibria of the bifur-
cation with mobile unskilled labor.




























Figure 11: Real factor rewards in the stable equilibria of the bifurcation with mobile
unskilled labor, NEs only.




























Figure 12: Real factor rewards in the stable equilibria of the bifurcation with mobile
unskilled labor, NEs and vertical MNEs only.




























Figure 13: Real factor rewards in the stable equilibria of the bifurcation with mobile
unskilled labor, NEs and horizontal MNEs only.




























Figure 14: Real factor rewards in the stable equilibria of the bifurcation with mobile
skilled labor, all ¯rms allowed, and NEs and horizontal MNEs only.


































Figure 15: Real factor rewards in stable equilibria of the bifurcation with mobile
skilled labor, NEs only, and NEs and vertical MNEs only.
S5S2 Existence of Firm-types
Figures 3(n)¡5(v) and (6(n)¡6b(v)) shed light on the existence, or non-existence,
of each ¯rm-type separately in the ¿ ¡ ¸L-space (¿ ¡ ¸S-space) for country i ¯rms
and all four scenarios of ¯rm regimes. Remember that the e®ects of the existence of
¯rm-types on the core-periphery patterns is discussed in the main text.1 Here, we
show for which values of transport costs and for which "size" of a country (where size
means a country's share of the mobile factor) the di®erent ¯rm-types are present.
S2.1 Unskilled Labor Mobility
First, we discuss all the scenarios in the case of unskilled labor mobility. Figures
3(n)¡3(v) show the ¯rm con¯guration for our standard scenario with all ¯rm-types
allowed. In this case, NEs mainly exist at low transport costs (see Figure 3(n)),
whereas horizontal MNEs dominate at high values of transport costs (see Figure
3(h)). Vertical MNEs, on the other hand, exist at all levels of transport costs, but
only at a very small scale when country i is very well endowed with unskilled labor
(see Figure 3(v)). Note that country i-based ¯rms become extinct, if a very small
share of the mobile factor is located in country i.
When only NEs and horizontal MNEs are allowed, NEs dominate at low transport
costs and when unskilled labor is very scarce (see Figure 4(n)). Horizontal MNEs
are present at high transport costs and for very high unskilled labor endowments
(see Figure 4(h)).
If only NEs and vertical MNEs may arise endogenously, NEs dominate almost every-
where (see Figure 5(n)). If a country is well endowed with unskilled labor, vertical
MNEs are present at all values of transport costs (see Figure 5(v)). Furthermore,
vertical MNEs occur in a lens at higher transport costs with the mobile factor being
rather scarce.
1Note that we omit the scenario of NEs only, since in this case NEs exist throughout, for all
values of transport costs and endowments with the mobile factor, and for both modes of factor
mobility, respectively.
S6Figure 3(n): Scenario "all ¯rm-types allowed": Existence of NEs
Figure 3(h): Scenario "all ¯rm-types allowed": Existence of horizontal MNEs
S7Figure 3(v): Scenario "all ¯rm-types allowed": Existence of vertical MNEs
Figure 4(n): Scenario "NEs and horizontal MNEs only": Existence of NEs
S8Figure 4(h): Scenario "NEs and horizontal MNEs only": Existence of horizontal
MNEs
Figure 5(n): Scenario "NEs and vertical MNEs only": Existence of NEs
S9Figure 5(v): Scenario "NEs and vertical MNEs only": Existence of vertical MNEs
S2.2 Skilled Labor Mobility
Now, we investigate the existence of ¯rm-types for all scenarios of skilled labor mo-
bility. Figures 6(n)¡6(v) illustrate the ¯rm-con¯guration in our standard scenario
when all types of ¯rms are allowed to coexist. Again, NEs mainly exist at low trans-
port costs, but if skilled labor is abundant, they also come into existence at higher
transport costs (see Figure 6(n)). Horizontal MNEs dominate at high transport
costs (see Figure 6(h)). Vertical MNEs, however, only play a somewhat minor role
in this scenario, since they only exist at low values of transport costs when skilled
labor is quite scarce (see Figure 6(v)).
In the scenario with NEs and horizontal MNEs only, both NEs and horizontal MNEs
arise in similar con¯gurations as in the scenario with all types of ¯rms (see Figures
6a(n) and 6a(h)).
If only NEs and vertical MNEs are allowed, NEs dominate almost everywhere (see
Figure 6b(n)). Vertical MNEs occur only at skilled labor abundance, almost regard-
less of the level of transport costs (see Figure 6b(v)).
S10Figure 6(n): Scenario "all ¯rm-types allowed": Existence of NEs
Figure 6(h): Scenario "all ¯rm-types allowed": Existence of horizontal MNEs
S11Figure 6(v): Scenario "all ¯rm-types allowed": Existence of vertical MNEs
Figure 6a(n): Scenario "NEs and horizontal MNEs only": Existence of NEs
S12Figure 6a(h): Scenario "NEs and horizontal MNEs only": Existence of horizontal
MNEs
Figure 6b(n): Scenario "NEs and vertical MNEs only": Existence of NEs
S13Figure 6b(v): Scenario "NEs and vertical MNEs only": Existence of vertical MNEs
S3 Robustness
In the following, we investigate the sensitivity of our ¯ndings with respect to changes
in the parameters ¹, ½ and ¾. For every new parameter value, we analyze the e®ects
with respect to our two reference cases for unskilled as well as skilled labor mobility,
where the respective immobile factor is equally allocated between the two countries.
These reference cases correspond to Figures 3 and 6 in the paper. Additionally, we
run experiments for unequal endowments with the immobile factor for both of our
reference scenarios.
S3.1 Alternative Values of ¹
Originally, we let consumers spend 80% of their income on manufactured goods
(¹ = 0:8). We lower this value to (i) ¹ = 0:7, (ii) ¹ = 0:5 and (iii) ¹ = 0:3, where the
latter corresponds to the value frequently used in new economic geography models,
for instance in Krugman (1991b) or Ekholm and Forslid (2001).
For both mobile unskilled labor (Figures 3¹(0.3), 3¹(0.5), 3¹(0.7)) and mobile skilled
S14labor (Figures 6¹(0.3), 6¹(0.5), 6¹(0.7)), we ¯nd that for lower values of ¹, MNEs
become less important, because less income is spent on manufactured goods so
that this industry becomes smaller. When gradually lowering ¹, the attractiveness
of MNEs diminishes, such that the equilibrium area of horizontal MNEs becomes
smaller and even vanishes. It is noteworthy that the dominance of horizontal MNEs
diminishes in a more pronounced way than that of vertical MNEs, since they face
higher ¯xed costs. Vertical MNEs, on the other hand, exhibit the opportunity to
exploit factor price di®erentials between countries.















Figure 3¹(0.3): Bifurcation with mobile unskilled labor, ¹ = 0:3, and ¸S = 0:5.















Figure 6¹(0.3): Bifurcation with mobile skilled labor, ¹ = 0:3, and ¸L = 0:5.















Figure 3¹(0.5): Bifurcation with mobile unskilled labor, ¹ = 0:5, and ¸S = 0:5.















Figure 6¹(0.5): Bifurcation with mobile skilled labor, ¹ = 0:5, and ¸L = 0:5.
S17Figure 3¹(0.7): Bifurcation with mobile unskilled labor, ¹ = 0:7, and ¸S = 0:5.
Figure 6¹(0.7): Bifurcation with mobile skilled labor, ¹ = 0:7, and ¸L = 0:5.
S18S3.2 Alternative Values of ½
We continue by analyzing the e®ects of a change of ½, the substitutability between
the two input factors in the production of manufactures. First, we change ½ from
¡1 to ¡5 (i.e., the technical rate of substitution falls from 1=2 to 1=6.). The lower
substitutability between skilled and unskilled labor causes skilled labor to become
more expensive. Thus, setting up MNEs becomes less attractive and, therefore, the
equilibrium area with only horizontal MNEs gets smaller and only exists at higher
values of transport costs (see Figures 3½(-5) and 6½(-5)). Moreover, the spreading
equilibrium remains stable for a relatively wide range of transport costs in case of
unskilled labor mobility (¿ / 0:19). Both partially agglomerated equilibria remain
stable for a wide range of transport costs.
Lowering ½ even further to ¡20 (i.e., changing the technical rate of substitution to
1=21), renders it even more di±cult to substitute production factors, which intensi-
¯es the pattern described above. The equilibrium area with only horizontal MNEs
becomes even smaller (both in terms of ¿ and ¸), and the partially agglomerated
equilibria exist for a wider range of transport costs, since especially horizontal MNEs
become less attractive. The spreading equilibrium in case of unskilled labor mobility
remains stable as long as ¿ / 0:21 (see Figures 3½(-20) and 6½(-20)).
An increase in the substitutability of production factors in manufacturing (changing
½ from ¡1 to 0:5 (implying a technical rate of substitution of 2) and 5=6 (which
corresponds to a technical rate of substitution of 6), respectively, leads to lower
factor prices. This makes MNEs ceteris paribus more attractive (see Figures 3½(0.5),
3½(5/6), 6½(0.5) and 6½(5/6)). The higher substitutability increases the equilibrium
area with only horizontal MNEs for a larger range of transport costs.
Overall, we can conclude that lower (higher) values of ½ shift the bifurcations to the
right (left).
S19Figure 3½(-5): Bifurcation with mobile unskilled labor, ½ = ¡5, and ¸S = 0:5.
Figure 6½(-5): Bifurcation with mobile skilled labor, ½ = ¡5, and ¸L = 0:5.
S20Figure 3½(-20): Bifurcation with mobile unskilled labor, ½ = ¡20, and ¸S = 0:5.
Figure 6½(-20): Bifurcation with mobile skilled labor, ½ = ¡20, and ¸L = 0:5.
S21Figure 3½(0.5): Bifurcation with mobile unskilled labor, ½ = 0:5, and ¸S = 0:5.
Figure 6½(0.5): Bifurcation with mobile skilled labor, ½ = 0:5, and ¸L = 0:5.
S22Figure 3½(5/6): Bifurcation with mobile unskilled labor, ½ = 5=6, and ¸S = 0:5.
Figure 6½(5/6): Bifurcation with mobile skilled labor, ½ = 5=6, and ¸L = 0:5.
S23S3.3 Alternative Values of ¾
Lowering the elasticity of substitution between varieties of the manufactured good
(¾), we ¯nd that the equilibrium area with only horizontal MNEs even vanishes (see
Figures 3¾(2) ¡ 6¾(6)). This is due to the fact that varieties of the manufactured
good are less substitutive. Thus, demand for manufactures is less sensitive to price
changes, which renders it less attractive for ¯rms to produce in both countries. This
is because the advantage of horizontal MNEs to be able to avoid transport costs
diminishes strongly. In other words, transport costs are less important. This is in
line with the result of Markusen (2002, p. 116), who ¯nds that the likelihood of
horizontal multinational ¯rms rises with the elasticity of substitution.
If unskilled labor is mobile, vertical MNEs become more attractive when gradually
lowering ¾. Figure 3¾(6) shows a large equilibrium area with horizontal MNEs for a
wide range of transport costs, whereas in Figure 3¾(2) this area has vanished, and
the partially agglomerated equilibria are dominated by vertical MNEs. A long-run
stable, symmetric equilibrium persists over the whole range of transport costs, if
unskilled labor is mobile and ¾ is su±ciently low (see Figure 3¾(2)).
For skilled labor mobility, we obtain full agglomeration for a all values of transport
costs at ¾ = 2, and the equilibrium area with horizontal MNEs vanishes due to
the decline in the advantage of horizontal MNEs to avoid transport costs and the
decreased ability of consumers to substitute between varieties of the manufactured
good (see Figure 6¾(2)). If the elasticity of substitution between varieties rises (at
¾ = 6, see Figure 6¾(6)), the opposite e®ect occurs and horizontal MNEs are present
over a wide range of transport costs (from ¿ ' 0:12).











Figure 3¾(2): Bifurcation with mobile unskilled labor, ¾ = 2, and ¸S = 0:5.















Figure 6¾(2): Bifurcation with mobile skilled labor, ¾ = 2, and ¸L = 0:5.
S25Figure 3¾(6): Bifurcation with mobile unskilled labor, ¾ = 6, and ¸S = 0:5.
Figure 6¾(6): Bifurcation with mobile skilled labor, ¾ = 6, and ¸L = 0:5.
S26S3.4 Asymmetric Endowment with the Immobile Factor
Finally, we analyze changes in the agglomeration patterns due to asymmetric en-
dowments with the immobile factor across countries. For this, we run experiments
for ¸S = 0:4 at unskilled labor mobility, and ¸L = 0:4 at skilled labor mobility.2
The resulting core-periphery patterns are depicted in Figures 3¸S and 6¸L.
In case of unskilled labor mobility (see Figure 3¸S), stable equilibria occur only
if country i is rather small in terms of its unskilled labor endowment. We ¯nd a
partially agglomerated equilibrium for a wide range of transport costs (0:005 / ¿ /
0:45) where NEs and vertical MNEs dominate. The equilibrium area with horizontal
MNEs arises at higher transport costs (¿ ' 0:24)
If skilled labor is mobile (see Figure 6¸L), we ¯nd that country i generally ends up as
the larger country due to is relative skilled labor abundance in the stable equilibria.
This makes it attractive especially for MNEs to set up their headquarters in i.
Note that the partially agglomerated equilibrium now occurs at high values of ¸S
(0:87 / ¸S / 0:98) as compared to the case of unskilled labor mobility in Figure
3¸S, where this equilibrium occurs at 0:19 / ¸L / 0:22. Again, horizontal MNEs
dominate at higher values of transport costs (see the equilibrium area in Figure
6¸L), whereas vertical MNEs are less important, as it is the case in our reference
scenario in the paper.
2Again, we consider country i as the immobile factor scarce one.
S27Figure 3¸S: Bifurcation with mobile unskilled labor, and ¸S = 0:4.
Figure 6¸L: Bifurcation with mobile skilled labor, and ¸L = 0:4.
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